As this is Thanksgiving weekend, it seems apposite to look at a bit of early American history.
The Congressional Resources site includes James Madison’s The Federalist Papers. Madison was one of the Founding Fathers and served as the fourth president from 1809 to 1817. (Image credit: Wikipedia)
Many Americans, including Republicans, today refer to the United States as a ‘democracy’.
Madison disagreed that the US should be a democracy. He supported a republican structure for the reasons he gave in Federalist No. 10, ‘The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection’, written in 1787 and addressed to the people of New York.
Considering the violence the United States has experienced over the past few years as well as corrupt factions inside both of the main political parties, Madison’s paper remains highly relevant today.
Excerpts follow, emphases mine.
Madison addressed the unrest going on at the time:
The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Because man has ‘fallible’ reasoning, Madison argued that:
different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
Therefore, whilst the causes of factions cannot be done away with, Madison believed their effects can be mitigated, which is the role of government:
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS …
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
He explained the dangers of a pure democracy:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
Hence, the only solution is to create a representative republic:
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
He explained the division of powers between federal and state governments:
The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
In conclusion, this is why the Founding Fathers created a republic, which, until the 1950s or 1960s, was commonly known among Americans as the Great Republic:
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
The founding of the United States is pivotal, even today, not only for America but for the rest of the world. It is a shame that more new countries since then did not adopt the same model of government. There are notional ‘republics’ in the world, but none more considered in its founding than the United States of America — the Great Republic.
8 comments
November 22, 2018 at 10:35 pm
sunnydaysall
That is why liberals want the Pledge Of Allegiance taken out of the classroom! I have watched many a teacher go blank when I confront them for telling students we live in a democracy! I have them recite the Pledge of Allegiance…
“I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”
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November 22, 2018 at 10:59 pm
churchmouse
Whoa! Excellent.
If your comment and the two graphics don’t encapsulate today’s America, what does?
Spot on!
I am delighted that you confronted teachers with the fact that the Pledge of Allegiance states (re Old Glory) ‘and to the Republic for which it stands’.
Yes, you are right. That is why lefties no longer want the Pledge of Allegiance recited daily before classes begin.
If I could ‘like’ this more than once, I would have done do. Consider it done, figuratively.
All blessings to you, sunnydaysall. You are a true American.
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November 23, 2018 at 8:57 pm
Mark C
Share this from Wikipedia to your “Democratic” friends: “The Democratic-Republican Party (FORMALLY the REPUBLICAN Party) was an American political party formed by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison around 1792 to oppose the centralizing policies of the new Federalist Party run by Alexander Hamilton, who was Secretary of the Treasury and chief architect of George Washington’s administration.”
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November 24, 2018 at 12:58 am
sunnydaysall
Now why would I ever take anything written in Wikipedia as serious truth… I call you one better…How about the fact that the Founding Fathers despised a 2-party system, period!
John Adams said: There is nothing which I dread so much as a division of the republic into two great parties, each arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition to each other. This, in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil under our Constitution. George Washington agreed… https://washingtonsblog.com/2011/07/the-founding-fathers-tried-to-warn-us-about-the-threat-from-a-two-party-system.html
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November 24, 2018 at 1:19 am
sunnydaysall
Hamilton can also be credited for the excuse our government has today for runaway borrowing with his European style budget that the country uses today. He created the idea of constant debt! He also used excise taxes that the farmers thought were abusive because they benefited the rich and hurt the Patriots after the war! Hamilton’s economic policies were what undermined the future of the Federalist Party, not Jefferson and Madison…
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/hamiltons-economic-policies
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November 24, 2018 at 1:21 am
sunnydaysall
enotechris eNotes educator| Certified Educator
In the day, Hamilton was considered to be a Federalist, who sought to expand national governmental power, whereas Jefferson and his followers were considered Anti-Federalist, who sought to keep political power local and individual. Hamilton, in attempting to demonstrate the federal power to pioneers at the edge of the frontier, got Congress to pass a levy tax on distilled whiskey, not to raise revenue, but to anger frontiersmen. They, of course, revolted in the Whiskey Rebellion, when they refused to pay the tax, and which the federal government then put down with its troops. On a more positive note, he believed in the Freedom of the Press when he argued the Zenger case (1735) and a National bank to stabilize United States Currency. He also promoted the full payment of government debt and Protective Tariffs which allowed American business to grow, but which caused higher prices for imported goods. Overall, his ideology tended to severely constrain through higher prices and taxes the small farmers whom Jefferson represented, and tended to benefit the already wealthy.
Rise of the American Nation, 1972
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November 23, 2018 at 5:07 pm
A Republic, NOT a democracy – Tales From The Deep State
[…] James Madison addressed and answered the “Why a Republic rather than a democracy” question in Federalist 10. The following is from the blog of Churchmouse, Churchmouse Campanologist and can be found at https://churchmousec.wordpress.com/2018/11/22/james-madisons-reasons-for-supporting-a-republic-over-… […]
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November 24, 2018 at 1:13 am
churchmouse
Thank you very much for the reblog, greatly appreciated.
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